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Off-the-Record Consultations and the Revised Model 
State Administrative Procedure Act 
Many suggestions have been made for legislation which will 
impose definite procedural standards on the activities of administra-
tive agencies. The basic aim of such legislation is to guarantee 
minimum, uniform, and fair modes of agency operation that are 
familiar to the participants and administratively efficient.1 Most of 
this commentary on administrative procedural reform, however, 
both-before and after the enactment of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946,2 has focused on the federal agencies.8 Thus, 
assessment of the need for procedural acts in the various states has 
been rather limited; in fact, prior to 1961 the only significant activ-
ities related to the states were the Report on Administrative Adju-
dication in New York4 and the Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.5 Such comparative neglect does not reflect the true 
significance of administrative law in state government. The opera-
tions of state agencies probably affect more people than do the 
activities of federal agencies;6 as a result, there has been increased 
concern in recent years for administrative procedural reform in the 
states. In 1961 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promul-
gated the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act,7 which 
was intended to function as a guide for state legislatures in evaluat-
I. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Am:, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 204 (1961) (Prefatory Note): l 
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (1965). 
2. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § lOOl(c) (1964). 
3. Major proposals leading to enactment of the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act were PRESIDEN"I'.'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGE• 
MENT IN nm GOVERNMENT OF nm UNITED STATES (1937): The Walter-Logan Adminis-
trative Procedure Bill, S. 915, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939): Attorney General's Comm, 
on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, 
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). See generally 1 COOPER, op, cit. supra note 1, 
at 7-13 (1965); DAVIS, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 6-12 (1965). Since 1946 the more 
important suggestions for revision of the federal act have been embodied in the COM• 
MISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T, TASK FORCE REPORT 
ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955); ABA FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED CODE OF 
ADMINISrRATIVE PROCEDURE (1957), introduced as S. 1070, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 
See generally Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The American 
Bar Association Program, 26 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1961). Two recent bills also 
contain extensive revisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. S. 1336, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1965); S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
4. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942), 
5. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 
202 (1946). 
6. See 1 CooPER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1-2. 
7. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISrRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT [hereinafter cited as REVISED 
MODEL Am:], in HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAws 206 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 HANDBOOK], and in 9C UNIFORM LAWS 
ANN. 123 (Supp. 1965). 
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ing the need for administrative· procedural reform and in enacting 
a comprehensive procedure act. 8 
The activities of administrative agencies are generally divided 
into two categories. The first, rulemaking, involves the formulation 
of policy and regulations of broad or general applicability. 9 While 
it is important to have minimum standards of procedure to govern 
rulemaking, the real value of any suggested procedure act depends 
in large part upon the standards governing the second category of 
administrative activity, adjudication-the delineation of individual 
rights and duties in specific factual settings.10 When an agency en-
gages in adjudicatory activity, the policy aims of fair procedure, 
efficient agency o_peration, and a consistent agency program seem to 
converge in direct confrontation. Although the Revised Model Act 
eschews the word "adjudication" in favor of the term "contested 
case,"11 this change in terminology in no way affects the basic prob-
lem of determining the most appropriate way to balance the policy 
objectives of fairness, efficiency, and consistency. Rather, the change 
was intended merely to avoid definitional confusion with "adjudica-
tion" under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act;12 "contested 
case" is defined more broadly than is "adjudication."18 Thus, the 
way in which a fair balance is struck between the various objectives 
of administrative activity is perhaps more important under the 
Revised Model Act than under the federal act. 
The drafters of the Revised Act have sought to resolve the con-
frontation of policy objectives in part by insisting that the decision 
maker refrain from off-the-record communications with any of the 
parties to the proceeding.14 However, there are a number of ambi-
guities in the act which indicate that it may be possible for state 
agencies to avoid this objective. Furthermore, implementation of 
the policy decisions of the drafters may prove to be undesirable for 
8. See 1961 HANDBOOK 205. 
9. See l CooPER, op. cit. supra note I, at 107-19. 
10. See id. at 119-24. 
11. REVISED MODEL Acr § 1(2): '"Contested case' means a proceeding, including but 
not restricted to ratemaking, [price fixing], and licensing, in which the legal rights, 
duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency 
after an opportunity for hearing." 
12. 1961 HANDBOOK 207. 
13. Rate fixing is part of rulemaking procedures under the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act § 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § IOOl(c) (1964), but comes within the 
"contested case" provisions in the REVISED MODEL Acr. The term "contested cases" 
under the REVISED MODEL Acr § 1(2) also specifically includes licensing. 
14. See REVISED MoDEL Acr § 13: "[Ex Parte Consultations.] Unless required for the 
disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, members or employees of an agency 
assigned to-render a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
a contested case shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any 
issue of fact, with any person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with 
any party or his representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to 
participate. An agency member (1) may communicate with other members of the 
agency, and (2) may have the aid and advice of one or more personal assistants." 
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the overall operation of state administrative agencies. This comment 
will consider these two possible criticisms of the Revised Model 
Act and will suggest that changes be made in the language of certain 
provisions when enacted by state legislatures. 
I. THE PROVISIONS 
Several provisions operate jointly to control off-the-record com-
munications by the decision maker in contested cases. In general, 
section 13 prohibits any ex parte consultation between the decision 
maker15 and a party,16 and section 9(e) delineates the information 
which the decision maker must include in the hearing record.17 
Specifically, section 13 provides that the decision maker cannot dis-
cuss questions of law with any party, nor questions of fact with the 
parties or any other person unless all parties are given notice and 
an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. However, section 
13 does permit agency members to consult among themselves and to 
have one or more personal assistants for aid and advice.18 Thus, it 
appears that the effect of section 13 will be to force all parties in a 
contested case to spread their evidence and arguments on the hearing 
record. The broadly inclusive record requirements of section 9(e) 
reinforce that interpretation of section 13. Section 9(e) states that 
the record must include not only all evidence19 and all matters of 
which official notice is taken20 but also all staff memoranda or data 
submitted for consideration by the decision maker.21 Moreover, the 
official comment to section 9 seems to indicate that memoranda and 
data submitted after an opportunity for reply must also form part of 
the record. 22 
The drafters' obvious attempt to isolate the decider of contested 
cases from influence outside the record reflects an effort on their 
part to eliminate at least two possible consequences of uncontrolled 
administrative adjudication. The first such consequence is secretly . 
15. See REvlsED MODEL Acr § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
16. REvlsED MODEL Acr § 1(5): "'Party' means each person or agency named or ad-
mitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a 
party." 
17. REVISED MODEL Acr § 9(e): "The record in a contested case shall include: (1) all 
pleadings, motions, intermediate rulings; (2) evidence received or considered; (8) a 
statement of matters officially noticed; (4) questions and offers of proof, objections, and 
rulings thereon; (5) proposed findings and exceptions; (6) any decision, opinion, or 
report by the officer presiding at the hearing; (7) all staff memoranda or data sub• 
mitted to the hearing officer or members of the agency in connection with U1eir 
consideration of the case." 
18. Also excepted is the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, REVISED 
MODEL Acr § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
19. REvISED MODEL Acr § 9(e)(2), quoted supra note 17. 
20. REvISED MODEL Acr § 9(e)(3), quoted supra note 17. 
21. REvISED MODEL Acr § 9(e)(7), quoted supra note 17. 
22. See 1961 HANDBOOK 214. 
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obtained ex parte information. In the Sangamon Valley Television 
cases28 and in the investigations of the Harris Subcommittee on 
Legislative Oversight,24 it was revealed that agencies and other 
parties sometimes rely heavily upon irregular approaches to the deci-
sion maker to. ensure a favorable outcome in their cases. 25 It is ot,-
vious that this practice can be inherently unfair to other parties in a 
contested case. Indeed, the same problem arises when the internal 
bias of the agency prosecution or investigatory staff is permitted to 
shape the outcome through ex parte contacts with the adjudicatory 
personnel of the agency. When this type of activity is exposed, it can 
only generate public distrust in the administrative process.26 Wheth-
er these practices are labeled "influence peddling" or are merely 
termed "off-the-record consultation," they still pose an insidious 
threat to the integrity and continued efficacy of the hearing process. 
It is apparent that the drafters also sought to place the burden of 
decision on one identifiable person. Heretofore, agencies have tra-
ditionally issued anonymous and impersonal group opinions, a 
practice which has created-not only fear of bias resulting from off-
the-record communications to the decision maker27 but also suspi-
cions that a conclusion in some contested cases is reached long before 
the rationale emerges, and that crucial determinations are often 
made by staff members other than the nominal decision maker.28 
23. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), 
vacating 255 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This litigation involved the propriety of ex parte 
approaches to members of the Federal Communications Commission regarding tele• 
vision channel allocations. 
24. See generally Hearings on Administrative Process and Ethical Questions Before 
the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the· House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The disclosures of this 
investigation and the manner in which it was handled provoked a book by the former 
chief counsel of the subcommittee. See SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND nm COMMISSIONS 
(1959). 
25. The incidents scrutinized at that time portrayed a shocking reliance by agencies 
and other parties on irregular approaches and the presence of suspicious financial 
dealings between at least one agency member and parties to a proceeding. See SCHWARTZ, 
op. cit. supra note 24, at lll. A spate of remedial suggestions resulted, including 
proposed codes of ethics and criminal sanctions. See generally Peck, Regulation and 
Control of Ex Parle Communications With Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REv. 
233 (1962); Note, Ex Parle Contacts With FCC in Quasi Judicial Proceedings, 73 HARV. 
L. REv. 1178 (1960). 
26. In short, there must not only be the intent to do justice but also the appearance 
that justice is done. See BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10; Peck, supra note 25, 
at 235. The oft-quoted query of Lord Hewart sharpens the point: "How is it to be 
expected that a party against whom a decision has been given in a hole-and-comer 
fashion ••• should believe that he has had justice?" HEwART, THE NEW DESPOTISM 48 
(1929). 
27. See Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative 
Procedure in Government Agencies, 5. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1941). 
28. See Beelar, The Dark Phase of Agency Litigation, 12 An. L. REv. 34, 35 (1959); 
Hector, Government by Anonymity, 45 A.B.A.J. 1260 (1959). Compare Nathanson, 
Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law, 33 IOWA L. REv. 252, 280 
(1948). 
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The Revised Model Act attempts to remove such possibilities by 
isolating the identified decision maker from off-the-record contacts 
with others29 and, except for advice from personal assistants to 
agency members, by placing on him the burden of deciding the 
case solely on the basis of the record.30 In fact, one commentator31 
has suggested that section 13 actually bars the use of a separate, 
anonymous opinion-writing staff.32 
II. AMBIGUITIES IN CONTESTED-CAsE DECISION MAKING 
A. Hearing Examiners 
The great volume of matters handled by many agencies requires 
that the members have assistance in disposing of the cases. The most 
familiar method of supplying such assistance is the one suggested by 
the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.33 At an 
initial hearl:ng, the examiner34 receives evidence, listens to argu-
ments, and makes findings of fact; depending on the exact scope of 
his duties, he may also- render an initial or recommended decision 
for the agency's consideration in making its final disposition.M In 
stark contrast to the federal act, the Revised Model Act does not 
indicate who is to hear cases or render decisions. While the diverse 
character of state agencies may have caused the drafters to forego any 
specific provision in regard to which person or persons shall hear the 
evidence, it is clear that the drafters did contemplate that initial 
hearings would be held in some types of contested cases. In the first 
place, section 9(e)(7) specifically r~fers to "data submitted to the hear-
ing officer or members of the agency."36 Second, section 11 requires 
29. See REVISED MODEL Acr § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
30. The broad requirements of§ 9(e), quoted supra note 17, are meant to supply the 
decider with all relevant information, while § 13 ensures that no other evidence is 
used. In addition, § 11, which operates when a majority of those making the final 
decision have neither heard the case nor read the record, attempts to force the nominal 
decider to make an actual determination. Under that section, if the decision is adverse 
to the respondent, there must be a proposed decision served upon the parties followed 
by an opportunity to present exceptions, file briefs, and argue orally. 
31. Bloomenthal, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Reform 
or Retrogression'!, 1963 DUKE L.J. 593, 614. 
32. If an agency member is himself rendering the decision, it is clear under the act 
that he can use personal assistants. Additionally, the section seems to allow the use of 
staff writers so long as the decider makes the actual decision and dictates the essence 
of the opinion without consulting the writers for suggestions. 
33. See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 7(a), S(a), 60 Stat. 241, 242 (1946), 5 U,S.C. 
§§ 1006(a), 1007(a) (1964). 
34. Section 7(a) states that the hearing may be presided over by all of the agency 
members, some of the members, or a hearing examiner. The last of these is almost 
always used. 
35. If the agency so directs, the decision of the hearing examiner may become the 
agency determination. See Administrative Procedure Act § B(a), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 
5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1964). 
36. REVISED MODEL Acr § 9(e)(7), quoted supra note 17, (Emphasis added,) 
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that a proposed decision be furnished to the parties, and that they be 
given an opportunity to file briefs and make oral argument in all 
cases where those who make the ultimate decision have not read the 
record. 87 This provision is an obvious recognition that someone 
other than agency members may make an initial determination.88 
Third, section 13 refers to "members or employees of an agency" as 
the persons who w.ould be assigned to "render a decision or to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law."89 The duality of the latter 
phrase suggests that a hearing examiner could render a complete 
decision. On the other hand, the hearer's only function might be to 
submit findings of fact or conclusions of law upon which the agency 
board or commissioners would make the final determination. In 
any case, it is clear that a hearing examiner would be used at the 
initial stage of the proceedings. 
Although it is apparent that the drafters contemplated the use of 
hearing examiners in some types of cases, it is not clear who can be 
appointed as an examiner. Such an omission constitutes a potential 
threat to the underlying policy of section 13. Since section 13 states 
that "members or employees of an agency assigned to render a deci-
sion ... shall not communicate ... with any party or his representa-
tive ... ,"40 it appears that the drafters did not contemplate the use 
of hearing examiners who were employed by a unit of the state 
government other than the agency itself. Nevertheless, such a system 
is used by at least one state, 41 and this external separation of decision 
making from agency prosecution could have sufficient appeal to be 
adopted in other jurisdictions. If the language "members or em-
ployees of an agency assigned to render a decision" is read to restrict 
the application of section 13 to situations where the decision maker 
is an employee or member, then a hearing examiner who is indepen-
dent of the agency would not be bound by the restrictions on ex 
parte consultations. In terms of policy, this interpretation would 
have to be premised on the belief that dangers of improper in-
fluence from parties are present only when the hearer draws his 
salary from the agency, and disappear when he is not an employee. 
Such a distinction seems untenable. Consequently, it would appear 
preferable to eliminate this possible means of avoiding the impact of 
section 13 by re-drafting the phrase to read: "those assigned to 
render a decision ... shall not communicate .... "42 
37. REVISED MODEL Ac:r § 11. 
38. See KY. LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH COMM., R.EP'T No. 12, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
LAW IN KY. 74 (1962). 
39. REVISED MODEL Ac:r § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
40. Ibid. 
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11370, 11502. 
42. See KY. LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH COMM., op. dt. supra note 38, at 87. 
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B. Personal Assistants to Agency Members 
As an exception to the requirements of section 13, agency mem-
bers themselves are permitted to have and to consult with personal 
assistants.43 On the surface, this provision seems to sanction the use 
of expert evaluation at _the critical point of most contested cases-the 
time of the making of the final decision. However, the Revised 
Model Act specifies neither the manner in which the personal assis-
tants are to be appointed nor the manner or extent of their per-
missible advisory function. Without statutory clarification of these 
critical points, it appears that the supposed safeguards of section 13 
could be nullified. 
Presumably, these assistants would be appointed and would func-
tion in a manner similar to a judge's law clerk.44 However, it would 
be possible for each agency member to recruit a permanent staff of 
experts whose duties would parallel those of the legal assistants to 
each member of the National Labor Relations Board.411 Alterna-
tively, each member or commissioner could appoint persons with 
expertise in differing fields. This method was the one established by 
the Communications Act of 1952, whereby each commissioner of 
the Federal Communications Commission was required to appoint 
legal, engineering, and administrative assistants.46 On the other 
hand, if agency members were permitted to appoint experts in 
various fields on an ad hoc basis, these assistants could be drawn 
from the ranks of the agency's prosecutors or investigators. Since a 
state agency normally would have limited manpower,47 some such 
arrangement might promote the most efficient utilization of staff. 
However, since these persons would be classified as personal assis-
tants to the decision makers, it would be theoretically possible for 
them to influence the outcome of cases, in contravention of the 
policy behind section 13. Dealing with this matter, several current 
proposals for revision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
are quite clear in prohibiting from assignment as a personal assis-
tant anyone who participates in agency business in an investigatory 
or prosecuting role.48 Since most commentators agree that investiga-
tors and prosecutors should not be part of the decision-making ap-
paratus, 49 it would seem that state legislatures, in enacting the 
43. See last sentence of-REvlsED MonEL Ar:r § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
44. See 2 COOPER, op. dt. supra note 1, at 441. 
45. See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 139 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1964), amending NLRA § 4(a), 49 Stat. 451 (1935). 
46. Communications Act of 1952, ch. 879, § 4, 66 Stat. 712. 
47. See 1 CooPER, op. dt. supra note 1, at 3-5; text accompanying note 64 infra. 
48. See S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(g) (1963); S. 1336, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) 
(6)(A) (1965); cf. S. 2335, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1005(c) (1963); S. 1879, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 1005(c) (1965). 
49. See, e.g., Bloomenthal, supra note 31, at 619. Compare STASON &: COOPER, CASES 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRmUNALS 333-36 (3d ed. 1957). 
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Revised Model Act, should include a provision similar to the sug-
gested proposals for federal agencies. 
There is a second potential weakness in the "personal assistants" 
exception to section 13. Specifically, such personal assistants may not 
have to observe the prohibition of secret ex parte communication. 
The assistants to whom the agency members may turn for aid and 
advice are likely to be agency employees, but they are not employees 
"assigned to render a decision.''5° Consequently, they might be con-
sidered at liberty to discuss with the parties any and all matters at 
issue. This only shifts the level of ex parte communication; it does 
not eliminate it. 51 Thus, an otherwise fair contested-case pro_ceeding 
could still be contaminated by off-the-record ·communications. 
C. Prohibition on Policy Discussion 
The rules against ex parte consultations specifically apply to 
communications concerning issues of fact and law.52 However, it is 
not clear whether the prohibition encompasses one of the most 
important aspects of effective agency operation-discussion of policy 
aims and goals. 58 It is clear that discussion of these policy concerns 
is not explicitly proscribed, and it is possible that section 13 does not 
even impliedly prohibit such activity. 
An official comment to section 13 states that the intention is 
"to preclude litigious facts reaching the deciding minds without 
getting into the record. Also precluded is ex parte discussion of the 
law . . . .''54 Generally, it would seem that ex parte discussions of · 
policy should be precluded as matters of law. Indeed, off-the-record 
policy discussions would appear to be wholly inconsistent with the 
drafters' attempt to eliminate secret communications of key informa-
tion. Furthermore, the adjective "litigious" apparently refers to facts 
over which there is disagreement or controversy. Since policy direc-
tions .may be central to this determination, they too would be pre-
cluded unless placed in the record. On the other hand, the drafters of 
the Revised Model Act may have been trying to draw the same dis-
tinction betlv-een litigious and nonlitigious facts as the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure made betlv-een 
"litigation" and "non-litigation" facts.55 The former referred to in-
5O. REVISED MoDEL Acr § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
51. If the personal assistants consulted with parties off the record at the instigation 
of, or on behalf of, the decider, there would be a violation of the prohibition against 
"indirectly" engaging in ex parte contacts. See R.EvlsE.D MODEL Acr § 13. 
52. See R.EvlsE.D MODEL Acr § 13, quoted supra note 14. 
53. The term "policy" is here used in a broad sense to include overriding goals, 
detailed objectives, and preferred means for implementing decisions which aim for 
those targets. 
54. See 1961 HANDBOOK 219. 
55. See Report of the Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, 
Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, '77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
'72 (1941). 
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formation gathered in the course of the inquiry surrounding the 
pending case, while the latter meant information developed over a 
period of time and constituting the agency's experience and exper-
tise. Since the category of "non-litigation" facts would clearly 
encompass policy, ex parte discussion of that policy would be per-
missible under this interpretation of the drafters' intent. In fact, 
such a distinction would appear to be consistent with the last sen-
tence of section 10(4), which specifically recognizes that "the agency's 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be 
utilized in the evaluation of the evidence."56 However, section 10(4) 
relates only to official notice, and limits the scope of official notice to 
"judicially cognizable facts" and "generally recognized technical or 
scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge."117 
Nevertheless, if agency policy has been previously set out in rules 
and regulations, it seems that these declarations would fit within the 
definition in section 10(4) of official notice as "judicially cognizable 
facts." Although this might be a potential device for obtaining neces-
sary policy guidance under the Revised Model Act, the wisdom of 
relying on it seems doubtful. Many federal agencies have astutely 
avoided use of the rulemaking process,58 and it is unlikely that state 
agencies will exhibit a different disposition:110 Thus, there may be 
little opportunity to refer to rules and regulations to escape the 
prohibitions of section 13. In addition, all matters of which official 
notice is taken must be presented to the parties, who must be given 
an opportunity to contest the accuracy of such matters.0° Conse-
quently, it appears that the range of official notice is too narrow, 
and the opportunity to contest too inviting, for effective use to be 
made of the official notice provision as a means of circumventing the 
section 13 prohibitions on ex parte discussions.61 
III. SOUNDNESS OF CONTESTED-CASE CONSULTATION PROVISIONS 
The analysis presented above has been directed to ambiguities in 
the prohibitions on off-the-record communications which may allow 
56. REVISED MODEL Ac::r § 10(4). 
57. Ibid. 
58. See FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISrRATIVE AGENCIES-THE NEED FOR BETIER 
DEFINffiONAL STANDARDS (1962); Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 652, 739.43 (1964). 
59. Clearly, some state agencies disregard the rulemaking process, Sec 1 COOPER, 
STATE ADMINISrRATIVE LAw 179-80 (1965). REvlsED MODEL Ac::r § 2 requires an agency to 
adopt as rules a description of its organization and the nature and requirements of all 
procedures available. This section also requires public disclosure of all rules and 
written statements of policy "formulated, adopted, or used by the agency." It is ques• 
tionable whether this requirement is sufficient to precipitate active use of the rule• 
making process, rather than contested cases, for articulating policy and statutory 
interpretations. 
60. Ibid. 
61. See DAVIS, CAsEs ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 585 (1965); Blumenthal, supra note 31, 
at 611. 
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agencies to avoid the clear policy aims of the drafters of the Revised 
Model Act. A second criticism of these provisions relates to whether 
they impose a valid method of day-to-day operations on state ad-
ministrative agencies. The soundness of the provisions can be chal-
lenged on several counts. · 
A. Size of State Agencies 
As is the case in most administrative procedure acts, the defini-
tion of "agency" in the Revised Model Act is extremely broad. In 
fact, i~ encompasses all state-government groups authorized to make 
rules or determine contested cases except the courts and the legis-
lature itself.62 Thus, the Revised Model Act governs such diverse 
bodies as the state apple commission, the liquor control commission, 
and the departments of the executive branch, such as the Secretary 
of State's office. Although the number of persons employed by an 
agency will of course vary with the scope of the agency's functions, 
state agency staffs are generally much smaller than their federal 
counterparts.63 Consequently, the drafters' attempt to segregate the 
decision maker and his personal assistants from the remainder of the 
agency staff may be impractical, for it is unlikely that a state agency 
will have sufficient personnel to assign assistants to each agency 
member and still provide a pool of staff experts for investigation and 
prosecution. Indeed, it is possible that only a few of the many state 
agencies will have the size to comply fully with the Revised Model 
Act. 64 While the act does not require the hiring of personal assis-
tants, the need for evaluation of records an,<I for guidance will 
probably compel the members to retain such assistants. Thus, where 
adequate personnel are not now empl9yed, the extent to which an 
agency can operate within section 13 will depend on its willingness 
to incur the expense of a larger staff.65 For the most part, it would 
appear that the increased cost will make this section impractical for 
many state agencies. 
Since the Revised Model Act was designed as a model rather 
than as a uniform act, it is clear that the legislatures can make 
62. See REvlsED MoDEL Acr § 1(1). 
63. See 1 COOPER, op. cit. supra note 61, at 3-5; FEsLER, THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 2 (1942). 
64. The late Chief Justice Vanderbilt has stated: "While segregation of functions · 
may be practicable in the case of the large federal agencies, it may often be a more acute 
problem in the state agencies with small staffs." VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 483 (1949). 
65. See BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK 70 
(1942); Hearings on S.I. No. !J827 and A.I. No. 5728 Before State of New York Senate 
and Assembly Committees on the Judiciary 12, May 11, 1965 (Testimony of G. Wallace 
Bates). According to Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility 
Rate Proceedings, 51 IowA L. REv. 267, 279 (1966), separate staffs of personal assistants 
are costly and are not required by the current problems. 
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necessary exceptions to the definition of "agency." However, exemp-
tions from the definition do not appear to be a satisfactory response 
to the problem. If section 13 is in fact designed to obtain funda-
mental fairness, 66 exempting even small agencies would simply 
perpetuate the dangers of secret consultation and combined prose-
cution and decision-making functions. One possibly viable solution 
would be to create a staff of independent hearing examiners not con-
nected to any one agency, but available to all the various agencies 
as the case loads of the agencies demand, supplemented by an ade-
quate means of giving to these examiners policy guidance and assis-
tance in record evaluation.67 
B. Essence of Agency Government 
Administrative agencies are deliberately established to utilize all 
three of the traditionally separate powers of government-legislative, 
executive, and judicial. 68 Within the boundaries delineated by its 
enacting statute, an agency is charged with the responsibility of 
exercising its expert discretion to formulate a coherent policy for 
assisting and regulating persons and interests. This awesome concen-
tration of the power to set, administer and enforce a segment of the 
law conflicts violently with historical notions of separation of 
powers.69 Consequently, there is a natural desire to require the 
agency to separate its functions and observe procedures that are in 
keeping with those functions. The division of procedure into rule-
making and adjudication is a partial response to this desire, as well 
as a recognition that added safeguards are needed, indeed perhaps 
constitutionally required, in the determination of individual rights 
and duties.. Traditional notions of the separation of powers also 
provide the impetus for segregating agency investigation and prose-
cution from compliance and enforcement decisions. However, any 
effort to model the agency decision-making process after the judicial 
process interferes with the very reason for having a functionally 
integrated "fourth branch of government." 
· Agency oper:ation is far more complex than would appear from 
the theoretical identification of legislative and judicial functions. 70 
66. See REvlsED MODEL Acr, 1961 HANDBOOK 204-05 (Prefatory Note). 
67. See suggestions discussed in text accompanying notes 87-91 infra. Cramton, supra 
note 65, at 279, indicates that consultation with the staff is more predominant in state 
agencies than federal agencies. 
68. The essential and "distinctive characteristic of the administrative process is its 
blending of different functions and powers in a single agency." Elman, A Note on 
Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652 (1965). See generally Reasons for Estab-
lishment of Administrative Agencies, in GELLHORN &: BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (4th 
ed. 1960). 
69. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T, 
TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 176 (1955). See generally 1 
COOPER, op. cit. supra note 61, at 15-29, 
70. Categorizing the administrative process in terms of legislative and judicial molds 
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Effective administrative activity involves functions which would not 
normally be a part of the rulemaking or adjudicatory process. Pro-
motion of the industry, negotiation, policy formulation, and exe-
cutive administration may be just as much a part of effective regula-
tion as are rulemaking and adjudication.71 Furthermore, it should be 
observed that contested cases may in practice be very similar to 
rulemaking, since the agency's broad concern in either type of pro-
ceeding is the formulation and implementation of a consistent 
policy program. The artificiality of the labels is emphasized by the 
example of ratemaking proceedings, which are considered "rule-
making" under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act72 but 
"contested cases" under the Revised Model Act.73 In short, no matter 
how it is broken down, agency operation is a broad continuum of 
functions having similar attributes and a common orientation. 
This continuum of agency functions· raises the basic questions 
whether, and to what degree, contested-case decisions should be made 
independently of the agency in order to ensure that fair procedure 
· will be followed. Modern regulation is intimately bound up with 
economic and technological considerations, and reasonable persons, 
experts as well as laymen, disagree in evaluating means and objec-
tives involving those considerations. 74 Therefore, choosing or pre-
ferring a certain approach or philosophy with regard to policy is 
both unavoidable and essential in formulating agency action and 
permeates all phases of the continuing process that is administration 
or regulation. 75 Policy-a statement of more or less controversial 
objectives-can be seen on all levels of administration. There is a 
gradation "from broad statements of purpose to increasingly specific 
decisions and action."76 Thus, in speaking of organizational· deci-
sions, one political scientist has drawn the following conclusion: 
In this complex hierarchy of decisions and actions, there is no 
logically discernible dividing line between "policy" decisions -
and "administrative" decisions nor between decision making 
and decision applying. The application of decisions itself in-
volves further decisions.77 
was probably done in part to facilitate the acceptance of the agency operations within 
the philosophic framework of separation of powers. See STASON &: COOPER, op. dt. supra 
note 49, at 1. Some impetus for this classification may also be ascribed to the desire to 
reduce an unfamiliar concept to known and familiar terms. See Woll, Administrative 
Law Reform: Proposals and Prospects, 41 NEB. L. REv. 687, 699 (1962). 
71. See Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 181 (1961). 
72. Administrative Procedure Act§ 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § lOOl(c) (1958). 
73. REvisED MODEL Am:§ 1(2), quoted supra note 11. 
74. See Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROB, 329, 341 (1961). 
75. "Policy-making is politics." Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1070 (1956). 
76. Parker, Policy and Administration, 19 PUB. AnMIN. (SYDNEY) 113, 117 (1960). 
77. Id. at 117. 
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The same writer has stated that "the 'administrative values' of effi-
ciency, consistency, and the like, require that decisions taken by less 
· authoritative individuals or bodies should not be inconsistent with 
or defeat the purposes expressed by more authoritative persons on 
the same subject."78 Consequently, if a hearing examiner is expected 
to play a meaningful role in contested proceedings, he must know 
the policy objectives already articulated by the agency and be able 
to evaluate a factual situation against those objectives. However, the 
breadth of this guidance will depend in large part upon the assigned 
role of the hearing examiner in the total process of decision making. 
Since the Revised Model Act fails to define this role, it is difficult to 
determine whether the preclusive provisions of section 13 will be 
detrimental to effective agency operation. If great reliance is placed 
on an initial decision, then the fact that section 13 may prevent the 
use of agency employees for policy guidance and record evaluation 
could hinder the administrative process. 
It has been argued that when the hearing examiner is charged 
only with finding basic facts, policy considerations simply should not 
play any part in his function.79 Although there can be no quarrel 
with that general proposition, apart from pointing out the occasional 
difficulty of ascertaining what precisely is a question of fact,80 the 
issue cannot be so readily determined. In certain types of agency pro-
ceedings it still may be necessary for the examiner to have assistance 
in evaluating data. For example, in rate proceedings before federal 
agencies a substantial number of experts may be utilized to evaluate 
the evidence.81 Furthermore, while facts can and should be estab-
lished independently of policy considerations, the bare facts may 
suggest several possible conclusions. Policy considerations, blended 
with the ultimate facts, provide a directional element to resolve 
the issue.82 Thus, if the hearing examiner is expected to make a 
complete recommended decision, and certainly if he is expected to 
render a final decision, he should have the overall policy goals of the 
agency in mind or within reach. Otherwise, he will be making his 
78. Id. at 117-18. 
79. See .BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 22. 
80. The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is highly evasive. 
See STASON &: COOPER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 525. 
81. See MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAw AND ADMINISTRATION 
93 (1952); Russell, The Role of the Hearing Examiner in Agency Proceedings, 12 An. 
L. REv. 23, 26 (1959). 
Although the hearing examiner or agency members may possess some personal ex• 
pertise, it is not likely to be sufficient to handle the wide range of special questions 
that arise. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcunvE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T, 
TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 22 (1949); Hearings on s. 658 
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
67, 168, 173 (1951). 
82. See Gardner, The Administrative Process, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND 
TOMORROW 108, 128 (Paulsen ed. 1959). 
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decision in a vacuum, and the agency will not have fulfilled its 
basic raison d'etre. 
Although an agency will submit its policy arguments and general 
goals at the hearing, this limited way for the examiner to learn policy 
· does not appear to meet the need. It is not until after the hearing 
that the decision is made, and it may be only at that point that the 
need for expert assistance is realized and policy explanations and 
interchange of ideas required. 83 Thus, one of the great dangers of 
section 13 is that the hearing examiner, who is unable to consult or 
otherwise obtain policy guidance, may render a report or decision 
based on policy considerations greatly divergent from those which 
the agency expected to be applied 1n the proceeding. This result has 
occurred at the federal level. For example, in the Civil Aeronautics 
Board's Seven States case,84 the hearing examiner spent two years 
hearing evidence, but produced a report based on very different 
policy foundations from those contemplated by the CAB. As a result, 
the CAB had to alter the routes decided upon by the hearing 
examiner. In short, the examiner's ignorance of policy goals creates 
the danger of dissonance between initial determinations and agency 
objectives, with consequent delay and added cost to litigants. 
When the decision is made by agency members rather than by a 
hearing examiner or other agency employee, there is scant danger 
of ignorance of policy. However, there is still a hazard of improper 
record evaluation. Often, the real expertise is in the staff rather than 
in the agency members.85 Unless there are open channels of com-
munication to this expertise, uninformed decisions are a distinct 
possibility. 86 
Regardless of the title and role of the decision maker, he must 
be within and not isolated from the mainstream of agency policy 
making if he is to be an effective participant in the regulatory proc-
ess. One possible way of achieving a fair balance between the needs 
of the agency and the protection of the individual has beep. ad-
vanced by Professor Davis. He suggests that hearing examiners be 
allowed to consult freely with staff specialists in formulating an ini-
83. See DAVIS, TEACHERS' MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 38, problem 212 (1965). 
The necessity for such explanations arises in part from a failure to utilize rule-making 
powers to delineate policy. See Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 652, 739-43 (1964). See generally 
Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781 
(1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of 
Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965). Such necessity also results in part 
from obscure or nonexistent standards in previous adjudication. See FRIENDLY, op. cit. 
supra note 60, at 5. 
84. See Hearings on Procedural Problems in Administrative Agencies Before the 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 231-32 (1960). , -
85. See DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 227; KY. LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH COMM., REP'T 
No. 12, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES LAw IN KY. 88 (1962). 
86. See Cramton, supra note 65, at· 279-80. 
1100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:10B6 
tial or recommended decision. The results of this consultation would 
then appear in the initial decision and could be subject to challenge 
by briefs or oral arguments to the final decider.87 Other possible 
means of meeting the need for assistance and consultation while still 
protecting the individual are those proposed in New York and Ken• 
tucky. The New York Law Revision Commission's proposed Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act follows the language of the Revised 
Model Act except that it permits an agency member to obtain the 
aid and advice of staff personnel other than those engaged in in-
vestigative and prosecuting functions.88 A proposed statute in Ken-
tucky prohibits the decision maker from consulting with "any per-
son, party, or agency member, who was engaged in the investigation 
or prosecution of the case."89 All other agency employees may be 
consulted. A third possible solution is that suggested by proposed 
amendments to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Senate 
Bill 1663 allows personal assistants to be assigned to the hearing 
presider or decision maker and permits any agency member to 
communicate with other members, their personal assistants, or any 
other agency employees who have not participated in the investiga-
tory or prosecuting functions.90 Senate Bill 1879 recognizes that it is 
proper for the hearing presider or decider to consult, for purposes of 
analyzing and appraising the record, with members of the agency, 
personal assistants, and any other agency employees not participating 
in investigatory or prosecuting activities.91 Before enacting the Re-
vised Model Act, state legislatures should consider these various al-
ternatives in light of the intended functions of the agencies to which 
the act would apply. In any case, the role of the decider must be 
clarified so that the assistance required by his functions can be pro-
vided at the critical moment and in a proper manner. Otherwise, 
adoption of the act involves a substantial risk of interfering with 
the very nature of administrative agencies. 
C. Types of Communications 
When the prohibition on communications of section 13 and the 
inclusive record requirements92 of section 9(e) are read together, it 
87. See 2 DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.12 (1958): DAVIS, op. cit. supra 
note 59, at 281. The suggested procedure would enable the decider to obtain necessary 
information and would remove the objection of anonymity. Cf. Cooper, Administrative 
Law: The Process of Decision, 44 A.B.A.J. 233, 235 (1958). 
88. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM,, LEG. Doc. No. 65(A), REPORT AND REcOM• 
MENDATIONS RELATING TO .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 49-50 (1965). 
89. KY. LEGISLATIVE R.EsEARCH COMM., op. cit. supra note 85, at 87. 
90. See S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(g) (1963). 
91. See S. 1879, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1005(c) (1965). The staff as a group may be 
one source of information for agency heads in agencies concerned primarily with rate 
proceedings. See Cramton, supra note 65, at 278-79. 
92. REVI5EI> MoDEI. ACT § 9(e), quoted supra note 17. 
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is apparent that the prosecuting arm of the agency must be certain 
that the special knowledge possessed by the agency experts is pre-
sented or read into the record-probably at the hearing.93 This pro-
cedure is too burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive to be 
practical.94 Fairness certainly does not require the judiciary to in-
clude its off-the-record thoughts or clerks' memoranda in the record. 
Furthermore, incorporation of memoranda and reports would pro-
vide fertile grounds for a delaying inquiry into collateral issues 
concerning the accuracy and completeness of the items. However, 
there is substantial support for the Revised Model Act's insistence 
that there be communication only when there is an opportunity for 
all parties to participate. For example, in Mazza v. Cavicchia,95 Chief 
Justice Vanderbilt, writing for the majority, held that the initial 
report or decision made by the hearing examiner must be com-
municated to both sides.96 In dicta the majority also indicated that 
all other items which are designed to influence the decision maker 
must be similarlY. communicated to the parties.97 It has been sug-
gested that one serious shortcoming of the reasoning in Mazza 
(and hence also of the provisions of section 13) is the failure 
to distinguish and approve proper consultations benveen decider 
and agency staff.98 Consultations which add undisclosed evidence 
or provide a substitute for presentation of facts at the hearing are a 
recognized evil, 99 but there is a crucial distinction benveen secret 
evidence and off-the-record ideas,100 since the latter can be vitally 
important to a full consideration of all aspects of a situation. For 
this reason, the judiciary commonly uses law clerks to analyze and 
evaluate the record and present ideas to the judges, who then 
analyze and argue among themselves the merits, ideas, and policies 
of the case. However, there seems to be just as great a need for a 
decider of contested agency cases to consider new ideas and to 
93. The requirements of the act are ambiguous. Section 10(4), dealing with official 
notice, stipulates that "parties shall be notified either before or during the hearing, or 
by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material noticed •••• " Inclusion 
of "or otherwise" clouds the whole requirement. 
94. See .BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 210-12. 
95. 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954) (state liquor commission). 
96. Id. at 503, 105 A.2d at 547-48. 
97. "It is a fundamental principle of all adjudication, judicial and administrative 
alike, that the mind of the decider should not be swayed by materials which are not 
communicated to both parties and which they are not given an opportunity to contro-
. vert." Id. at 516, 105 A.2d at 555. This principle and the Mazza decision are dis-
cussed with approval in Schwartz, Institutional Administrative Decisions, 4 J. Pun. L. 49, 
85 (1955). But cf. T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 777 
(S.D. Tex. 1960), afj'd sub nom. Herrin Transp. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 419 (1961). 
98. See 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 87, § 11.09; 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 1307, 1309 (1954); 
68 HARv. L. REv. 363, 364 (1954). 
99. See BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 210. 
100. See authorities cited note 98 supra. 
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analyze and evaluate record evidence.101 The technical nature of 
many fields may demand considerable expert assistance in these 
tasks. 
The requirement that all matters, including those officially 
noticed, must be entered on the record and not be obtained ex 
parte102 also fails to distinguish adjudicative facts-those "concern-
ing the immediate parties"103-from legislative facts-general facts 
not ordinarily concerning the parties to the case.104 Adjudicative 
facts must be developed and supported on the record, whereas "find-
ings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, frequently are 
not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence."100 The 
judiciary frequently and quite properly obtains legislative facts by 
an ex parte process without offering support on the record.100 
A permissible procedure would be to have staff experts present 
their evaluations or other contributions to the decision maker "upon 
notice and opportunity for all parties to participate."107 However, 
such a presentation may be tantamount to a new hearing or a re-
opened hearing entailing great delay and expense. A better solution 
is Professor Davis' proposal that the decider consult experts as 
needed and then make the results known to all parties. Objections 
by way of briefs or oral argument might then be permitted.108 
Whatever form such arrangements may assume, it appears that some 
straightfonvard mode of getting information to the decision maker 
is necessary. Prohibiting communications is no solution, and per-
mitting communications only "upon notice and opportunity for all 
parties to participate" seems inadequate and extremely awkward. 
101. The necessity for evaluating record evidence has been recognized by an official 
spokesman for the American Bar Association. See Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, and S. 
1879 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1965) (testimony of Robert M, 
Benjamin). A principal purpose of the ex parte communication provisions in the 
proposed Kentucky act is to give decision makers off-the-record ideas from impartial 
staff members while protecting the parties against the use of extra-record facts. See 
KY. LEGISLATIVE R.EsEt\RCH COMM., op. cit. supra note 85, at 88; cf. DAVIS, op. cit. supra 
note 59, at 226. 
102. See REVISED MODEL ACT § 9(e)(3). 
103. 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra n.ote 87, § 15.03. For added discussion relative to adjudi-
cative facts, see I id. §§ 7.02, 7.04. 
104-. Legislative facts are facts "which help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or 
discretion in determining what course of action to take." Id. § 15.03. 
105. Ibid. "Administrative tribunals in making their findings are free and indeed 
required, to draw upon the entirety of their specialized experience, which is necessarily 
undisclosed in the record," Feinstein v. New York Central R.R., 159 F. Supp. 460, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
106. See generally 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 87, § 15.03 (Supp. 1965). 
107. REVISED MoDEL ACT § 13, quoted supra note 14-. 
108. See BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 213; DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 83, at 
38, problem 212; 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 87, § 11.12; text accompanying notes 
88-91 supra. 
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D. Narrow Range of Applicability 
Adjudication-the contested-case process-is commonly pictured 
as a two-stage procedure. The first stage involves correspondence, 
conferences, interviews, inspections, and negotiation.109 If this initial 
stage fails to dispose of the problem satisfactorily, then the agency 
must resort to the second stage, which involves the formal hearing 
apparatus. It is only at this second stage that the provisions govern-
ing contested cases are applicable.110 Thus, there are many cases 
which involve determinations of private rights and duties but are 
not governed or even affected by the procedural safeguards under 
the Revised Model Act. Furthermore, the realities of agency adju-
dication do not conform precisely to this two-step model. Instead, 
the informal activity of the initial stage is carried over and con-
tinued during the formal process.111 Research conducted by Pro-
fessor Woll shows that extensive use of informal processes has been 
made from the very beginning in many federal agencies, and that 
a trend toward the use of informal processes, which are perhaps in-
herent in administrative adjudication,112 is greatly increasing today 
in nearly all agencies.113 Thus, the contested-case provisions may 
actually interfere with the most effective means of administrative 
adjudication. 
As a result of his research, Professor Woll has formulated the 
hypothesis that "requirements of public policy, expertise, and speed 
have rendered administrative adjudication today primarily informal 
in nature."114 This hypothesis is quite at odds with the theory that 
agency determinations of private rights and duties are basically 
similar to decisions of the judiciary. The hypothesis sharply ques-
tions attempts to separate adjudication as a function independent 
of agency influence. Furthermore, if section 13 is indicative of an 
overriding policy i~ favor of minimal procedures to guide deter-
109. These procedures are examined in detail in WoLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, THE 
INFORMAL PROCESS (1963). Articles by the same author on portions of the same subject 
are Woll, The Development of Shortened Procedure in American Administrative Law, 
45 CORNELL L.Q. 56 (1959); Woll, Administrative Law Reform: Proposals and Prospects, 
41 NEB. L. REv. 687 (1962); Woll, Informal Administrative Adjudication, 7 U.C.L.A. 
L. REv. 436 (1960). 
110. Contested case procedures are required only when "the legal rights, duties, or 
privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an oppor-
tunity for hearing." REvISED MonEL Acr § 1(2). "By law" apparently includes situa-
tions in which only a constitutional requirement exists, as well as those in which a 
statute provides for a hearing. Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
111. See WOLL, op. dt. supra note 109, at 28. 
112. See id. at 29. 
113. See id. at 101, 14-2, 164. 
114. Id. at 2. Professor Woll uses the term "adjudication" in the sense of making 
a decision disposing of the case, rather than a particular statutory procedure to be 
followed when an opportunity for hearing is required by law. 
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minations of private rights and duties in particular factual settings, 
then the absence of any safeguards in cases where the formal hearing 
stage is not reached may constitute a serious gap in the effectuation 
of this policy objective. Section 9(d) of the Revised Model Act 
responds weakly to the problem by providing that "unless precluded 
by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by 
stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or default."116 At best, 
this section merely recognizes that informal procedures do exist. 
Neither it nor any other section of the act encourages prompt dis-
position of matters or requires the agency to disclose information or 
establish internal restraints on otherwise uncnecked power.110 
Proper recognition of informal processes, as well as adequate 
provisions governing their use in a procedural statute, would ensure 
fairness without weakening an efficient and useful tool of adminis-
trative agencies. In fact, informal procedures may be just as desirable 
to the respondents. The advantage of these procedures is twofold. 
In the first place, the real foundation for meaningful decisions lies 
in the various contacts with the parties which are established through 
other agency functions, such as promotion of the industry. These 
contacts supply basic background data and establish the channels of 
mutual understanding necessary for effective regulation.117 Second, 
encouraging, informal exchanges could remove the necessity for 
severing communications simply because some arbitrary point 
termed "formal adjudication" is reached. It is highly artificial and 
sometimes a bit meaningless to impose prohibitions on consultation 
between the hearer and a party concerning information freely ex-
changed at an earlier point.118 However, the parties receive the full 
advantages of informal procedures only when the use of such pro-
cedures conforms to notions of due process and fundamental fair-
ness. For example, a conference of all parties in which information 
is freely exchanged offers the opportunity to stir the mind of the 
deciders, to examine tangential items, to learn the agency's thinking, 
and to clarify positions and challenge premises.119 Such a procedure 
would appear far superior to the prohibition of ex parte com-
munications as a method of ensuring that an argument reaches the 
115. REvlsED MODEL Ar:i: § 9(d). 
116. REvlsED MODEL Ar:i: § 2(a) reads: "In addition to other rule-making require• 
ments imposed by law, each agency shall: ••• (2) adopt rules of practice setting forth 
the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available, including 
a description of all forms and instructions used by the agency • • • ," However, there 
is no provision regulating the content or scope of the required agency rules, 
117. See WoLL, op. cit. supra note 109, at 44. 
118. Cf. :Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The American 
Bar Association Program, 26 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 203, 234 (1961): Hearings on SJ, 
3827 and AJ. 5728 Before State of New York Senate and Assembly Committees on the 
Judiciary 79, May 11, 1965 (testimony of Robert D. :Brooks). 
119. See Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 
589, 596 (1941). 
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minds of the deciders. A respondent who is able to confront the 
staff in discussion, plead his case, and learn their views may feel far 
more protected than with elaborate and awkward formal hearing 
procedures. In addition, round-table conferences might be the most 
feasible way for small agencies to conduct their affairs, since the 
staff is usually inadequate for a real separation of functions or for 
full compliance with section 13. 
The advantages of fairness and protection for the respondent are 
present, however, only if there is assuran_ce that the agency. is dis-
closing in good faith its position and the information available to it. 
Without rules or safeguards in an administrative procedure statute, 
it is in the sole discretion of each agency to conform its informal 
procedures to basic standards of fairness through the use of internal 
checks, completely open conferences, or other devices.120 Thus, a 
statutory standard is needed to ensure that fairness is observed.121 
Perhaps the best solution is to impose a standard of good faith 
disclosure of relevant information, including testing procedures and 
inspection reports, on both the agency and the parties. Any require-
ments beyond this general safeguard must vary with the subject 
matter entrusted to the agency. For instance, standards of equitable 
operation under blue sky laws are not likely to be identical to 
standards of fairness in the proceedings of a state athletic commis-
sion or liquor authority. Thus, state legislatures should incorporate 
more specific standards into the acts establishing each agency, with 
a general cross reference to the basic standard imposed by the state's 
standard administrative procedure act. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the Revised Model Act focuses on the heretofore neglected 
requirements of state agencies, it must be viewed as a beneficial con-
tribution to the ar_ea of administrative government. However, the 
contested-case procedures are open to extensive criticism. In the 
first place, provisions dealing with ex parte communications by the 
decider are sufficiently ambiguous to allow agencies to avoid their 
· impact. The status of hearing examiners, personal assistants, and 
ex parte discussions of policy all need further clarification. Second, 
substantive operation of the provisions can be challenged for imprac-
ticality as applied to small state agencies, for failure to distinguish 
proper from improper communications, for a general blindness to 
the nature of agency government, and for ignoring the extensive use 
120. See generally WoLL, op. dt. supra note 109, at 186-89. 
121. Standards for some types of informal adjudication were proposed in CoMMIS• 
SION ON ORGANIZATION OF ExECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON 
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 170 (1955). See 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 127 
(1965). 
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of info!1Ilal procedures. The result is an act filled with uncertainty 
and debatable validity. 
Before enacting the Revised Model Act, state legislatures should 
give serious consideration to modification of section 13. Its several 
ambiguities can probably be eliminated without real problems. With 
regard to off-the-record consultations in the context of formal hear-
ings, there is considerable merit in permitting the hearing examiner 
to consult with agency members and with staff experts who have not 
participated in the investigation or prosecution of the case. Similarly, 
agency members, in rendering a final decision, should be able to 
consult with those same staff members. Such a procedure would 
help ensure the availability of critically important expert record 
evaluation and policy guidance. As a realistic and desirable safe-
guard for the respondent, this method of handling the problem 
might also require that an explanation of the consultation and its 
results be given to all parties. At the same time, some attention 
should be given to· imposing minimum standards on the informal 
process so that the wide range of informational and regulatory de-
vices present in that process are used fairly. 
Only by a substantial modification of contested-case procedures 
along the lines of the above suggestions will this portion of the Re-
vised Model Act meet the needs and realities of administrative law 
in the states. Adoption without alterations seems inappropriate. A 
forthright mode of dealing with the demands and stresses found in 
the agency setting seems healthier for the life of the administrative 
process than attempts to remove these inherent difficulties.122 
John H. Martin 
122. Cf. Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, '74 YALE L.J. 652 (1965), 
.r 
